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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the negotiation process that 
terminated the Tajik civil war and the reasons behind its success, a modest 
but notable one given the frequent difficulty in ending civil wars through 
negotiation. The article provides an overview of the Tajik negotiation process, 
using the three-stage model of the negotiation process. Based on this 
chronological account and analysis, the concluding part of the article 
examines key factors that came into play in bringing about the negotiated 
settlement. It has been shown that the Tajik negotiations went through 
qualitatively distinct stages suggested by the model, and that the negotiated 
outcome was made possible primarily as a result of the interplay between 
internal dynamics among the warring parties and external involvement of 
major third party interveners, namely Russia, Iran, and the United Nations.  
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Introduction 
 
While the Tajik conflict is among many civil wars that erupted around the globe in the 
wake of the Cold War, it has received much less international attention and publicity 
than other post-cold war internal wars, such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Rwanda, and Somalia. Yet it was no less bloody and brutal, and as in other civil wars, 
there existed serious mutual distrust and strong commitment to a unilateral, military 
solution, as well as stubborn resistance toward a negotiated, political solution, from 
beginning to end, on the part of both the Tajik government and the opposition. Viewed in 
this light, the Tajik civil war is noteworthy for its relatively rapid settlement through 
negotiation in June 1997, after having escalated into a full-scale war in May 1992 
(Barnes and Abdullaev 2001: 8). Thus, an explanation of how the Tajik civil war came to 
a negotiated settlement and why it eventually became possible is called for. This article 
attempts to answer these questions. 
After providing some brief background information regarding the nature and 
- 2 - 
 
history of the conflict, this article examines the negotiation process in Tajikistan, 
drawing on the model of a negotiation process put forward by Zartman and Berman 
(1982). In their model, the process generally consists of three stages: (1) the diagnostic 
phase (or prenegotiation), where conflicting parties diagnose the situation, explore the 
possibility of negotiating, and decide to do so; (2) the formula phase, in which they try 
to reach a common definition of their conflict and negotiate a formula for solution; and 
(3) the detail phase, where the parties negotiate the specifics of that formula. Certainly, it 
is a tall order to clearly distinguish these stages in reality; they might overlap each other, 
and there can also be movement back and forth between them. Nonetheless, the use of 
the model is intended to provide the structure for analysis and enhance a more 
systematic understanding of the Tajik negotiation process, which might otherwise appear 
to be a mere train of events. Drawing on this analysis of the negotiation process, the last 
part of this article then discusses the reasons behind the successful outcome.
1
 
 
The Civil War in Tajikistan 
 
There is a tendency among casual observers to treat the Tajik conflict as an ideological 
clash between secular conservatism and Islamic fundamentalism. Certainly, ideology 
was a factor that led Tajik parties to wage this conflict. The ruling elite of the 
Communist Party strove to preserve the old Soviet order and a secular state in Tajikistan, 
in which it would continue to assume a monopolistic role. The Islamic-democratic 
opposition alliance, in contrast, advocated a change to the status quo through the 
building of a democratic state, in which previously underrepresented forces, especially 
Islam, were to have the voice they deserved. This ideological dimension of the conflict 
provided a rationale for the alignment of external stakeholders; Russia and Central Asian 
states shored up the neo-Soviets, while Iran and other Islamic states sided with the 
Islamists. 
But most expert accounts of the conflict depict it as rivalries between local groups 
rather than between ideological camps. For instance, Olivier Roy (1998) has stressed 
that the primary cause of the Tajik conflict was deep-rooted localism, and that the ethnic 
explanation emphasizing Tajik-Uzbek animosity is inadequate to grasp the core of the 
Tajik problem. Indeed, the integrity of the Tajik state has remained fragile and the 
identity of the Tajiks has been based on affiliation to a particular region rather than the 
state itself. Tajikistan‘s structural and topographical features are background factors 
causing such regionalism. At the time of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic‘s creation in 
1929, its border was demarcated in such a way that the republic happened to contain 
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 The author‘s earlier article (Iji 2001: 360-364) contains a chronological summary of the inter-Tajik 
negotiations. 
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many ethnic minorities inside of the border, while leaving a large portion of the world‘s 
Tajik population outside (Akiner 2001: 13-15). Nonetheless, it was Soviet policies that 
added elements of rigidity and exclusionism to regionalism in Tajikistan. They caused 
political and economic disparities among regions, giving rise to regionally-based patron-
client networks that vied for the power and benefits it necessarily brought (Atkin 1997: 
292).  
As long as the Soviet system of rule, dominated by the nomenklatura, had 
continued to fulfill its intended functions, regionalist tensions had been held in check. 
However, by the mid-1980s, as the Soviet regime underwent reform and its control over 
Tajikistan‘s state apparatus weakened, power struggles among the country‘s different 
regions intensified. By the end of the 1980s onwards, the ruling elite from Leninabad in 
the north, who had been the most privileged politically and economically, were 
increasingly challenged by major opposition movements with nationalist, democratic, 
and Islamic orientations, which drew support from the southern regions of Gharm, 
Kurgan-Tyube, and Gorno-Badakhshan. In order to fight against these opposition groups, 
Leninabad entered into an alliance with the southern region of Kulyab, which was able 
to provide military muscle. Concurrently, the collapse of the Soviet‘s centralized, 
planned economy placed a serious strain on Tajikistan‘s economy, which was the poorest 
of all the Soviet republics, highly dependent on subsidies flowing from Moscow. As a 
result, regions within the country became caught up in the struggle for scarce resources 
(Akiner 2001: 25-27; Niyazi 1994: 168-179). 
The weak governance structure of the Tajik state was increasingly strained by a 
combination of such factors as large-scale mass mobilization for political activities, the 
severe economic plight, the general breakdown of law and order, and the emergence of 
militias for self-defense. As regionalism—a fault line in the Tajik society—became 
salient, the newly formed coalition government failed to govern the country effectively 
in the face of strong disapproval from the Leninabadi-Kulyabi alliance. The anarchical 
situation eventually led to a full-scale civil war in mid-1992 (Lynch 2001: 49-55; Rubin 
1993). Since it was the Popular Front, the Kulyabi militia, apparently aided by Russian 
and Uzbek forces, that defeated opposition forces, the Kulyabis, led by Emomali 
Rakhmonov, took the lead in forming a government in November 1992, treating the 
Leninabadis as a junior partner. The Rakhmonov government moved to consolidate its 
embryonic rule and restore order, continuing the military offensive against opposition 
strongholds. Even after the peak of violence in early 1993, there occurred incessant 
fighting, particularly on the Tajik-Afghan border, as opposition forces, assisted by 
Afghan militants, continued to make an armed incursion from northern Afghanistan into 
southern Tajikistan. The Russian military, in the form of the 201
st
 Motorized Rifle 
Division and Border Troops, served as the backbone of forces to launch a counterattack 
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and maintain law and order in the country (Lynch 2000: 150-172). It then took 
approximately one year for the Tajik parties to come to the negotiating table under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN). 
 
Lead-up to Negotiations: The Diagnostic Phase 
 
While it is rather difficult to pinpoint the onset of the diagnostic phase in the Tajik case, 
it is certain that it was a shift in Russian policy toward Tajikistan in mid-1993 that 
provided a major impetus to the preparations for the launch of negotiations between the 
Tajik parties. In July, a serious crisis on the Tajik-Afghan border, in which the 
opposition‘s onslaught claimed the lives of a substantial number of Russian servicemen, 
alarmed Russian policymakers and made them recognize that it was no longer feasible to 
rely on military means exclusively. The possibility of initiating negotiations that would 
seek a political settlement of the conflict thus became necessary (Jonson 1998: 9). 
Russia accelerated diplomatic initiatives to sound out the Tajik adversaries and 
interested states in the region on their willingness to engage in negotiations. In parallel, 
the UN, represented by Secretary-General‘s Special Envoy Ismat Kittani, also held 
successive talks with Tajik and external stakeholders in order to mobilize regional 
peacemaking efforts (UNSG 1993).  
What proved to be a further step in Russia‘s efforts at paving the way for 
negotiations was the meeting between Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Director 
Yevgeny Primakov and Said Abdullo Nuri, the leader of Tajik Islamists, held in Tehran 
in November. There, Primakov reassured Nuri that the Islamic opposition would be a 
legitimate party to the negotiations, in exchange for the latter‘s acknowledgement of 
Russian interests and continued military presence in Tajikistan (Dubnov 1996: 50; Lynch 
2001: 58-59). While intensifying diplomatic efforts, Moscow also undertook to 
coordinate peacekeeping activities with Central Asian states within the framework of the 
Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
Mediation efforts aimed at bringing about negotiations gained momentum after 
the turn of the year. In early 1994, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, a newly appointed UN special 
envoy, confirmed the basic willingness of both Tajik sides to start negotiations under UN 
auspices without any preconditions (UNSG 1994a). In March, Russian First Deputy 
Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin succeeded in clearing final obstacles to the opening 
of negotiations. After visiting Dushanbe and eliciting the Tajik government‘s firmer 
commitment to the talks, Adamishin went to Tehran, where he convinced the opposition 
to reciprocate, while resolving other outstanding procedural issues regarding venues and 
observers. Adamishin also confirmed with Iranian officials that two countries would 
cooperate to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan (BBC 1994). 
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Meanwhile, a process of various opposition elements coalescing into a single 
entity was under way. They were widely varied in terms of ideological, geographic, and 
organizational orientations, and the issue of who would represent them was a major 
obstacle to the onset of official negotiations. On the Islamist side, the Movement for 
Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT), of which the Islamic Renaissance Party of 
Tajikistan (IRP) formed the core, was set up in Taloqan, northern Afghanistan, by exiled 
opposition leaders under Nuri‘s chairmanship (Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh 2002: 144). 
On the moderate side, the Coordination Center of the Democratic Forces of Tajikistan in 
the CIS was established in Moscow (Abdullaev and Barnes 2001: 84). Eventually, these 
opposition parties and movements joined together to form the United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO), which was to act as a negotiating partner with the Tajik government. Such a 
―valid spokesperson‖ for the opposition side is what ought to be put in place during the 
diagnostic phase in the context of negotiations in internal conflict (Zartman 1995: 10). 
 
The Launch of Negotiations: The First Formula Phase 
 
Whereas the formula phase is conceived as a single stage in Zartman and Berman‘s 
framework, it is subdivided into three periods when applied to the Tajik case, with the 
aim of pointing out qualitative differences in the way the formula was actually 
negotiated (or not negotiated seriously enough) by the parties. Again, the boundaries 
between each phase are inevitably blurred, but such conceptual distinction is intended to 
serve an analytical purpose. 
The Tajik government and the opposition entered into formal negotiations in 
Moscow on 5 April 1994. The UN sponsored the successive negotiations, with Piriz-
Ballon acting as the chief international mediator. The talks were also attended by 
representatives from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Turkmenistan, as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)—known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
until December 1994—and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). These 
observer states took turns hosting successive rounds of talks.
2
 The presence of these 
third parties at the talks worked to internationalize and legitimize the negotiation process. 
In the Moscow round, the two sides managed to set the agenda for the following 
rounds of the negotiations, identifying three clusters of issues: political settlement, 
refugees and internally displaced persons, and the structure of government in Tajikistan 
                                                             
2
 Precisely speaking, some of them joined the observer group in the middle of the negotiation process. 
Turkmenistan served as an observer from the Ashgabat round in November 1995, the CSCE/OSCE 
from the Tehran round in June 1994, and the OIC from the Islamabad round in October 1994 
(Goryayev 2001: 34-35). 
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(UNSG 1994b). Although some tangible result was achieved as to the second issue in the 
form of the agreement on the creation of a joint commission, substantial progress was 
lacking in the first and third issues. In regard to the first issue, the sides were unable to 
agree on a ceasefire; the government demanded as a precondition for serious negotiation 
that the opposition should lay down their arms and surrender, while the opposition 
regarded the rebellion as the only way to have its grievances heard, doubting the 
seriousness in seeking a negotiated solution on the part of the regime. 
With respect to the third issue, the part and parcel of the formula for a solution, 
there appeared to be the largest difference between the positions of the two sides. The 
opposition presented a proposal to set up a State Soviet or Council of National 
Agreement, a transitional body that would consist of the representatives of the 
conflicting parties on a fifty-fifty basis. The government flatly rejected the proposal 
because it was not interested in any sort of power-sharing at this stage. Such a position 
was apparently influenced by Russia, which was diplomatically active as the host for the 
round, but was only half-hearted about pursuing a political solution. This was partly 
because there was an internal split within the Russian leadership; while the Foreign 
Ministry was keen to pursue a political solution through the UN-mediated negotiations, 
the military viewed the efforts with suspicion and favored a military solution 
(Zviagelskaya 1998: 163-164). Amid deepening tensions that were a result of the 
publication of a new draft constitution by the government, the Tajik parties met in 
Tehran on 18 June for the second round of negotiations. They focused on reaching an 
agreement on a ceasefire, and although they were eventually able to agree on the 
temporary nature of the ceasefire, as well as on what kind of hostile activities were to be 
prohibited, they failed to seal the agreement due to the difference over the timing of its 
effectuation (Panfilov 1994). Following these inconclusive talks, the government moved 
to further consolidate the regime. At the nineteenth session in mid-July, the Tajik 
Supreme Soviet approved the draft constitution, announced the holding of a referendum 
on it in September, and decided to conduct a presidential election simultaneously. As the 
opposition responded by stepping up its military operations, the peace process stalled, 
and the UN moved to bring some pressure to bear on the parties to demonstrate their 
commitment to the negotiations by threatening to suspend them. Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned that the deteriorating situation obliged him to reconsider 
whether to continue to prepare for the third round of talks in Islamabad. This warning, 
together with increased military pressure from the opposition, induced the government 
to declare some conciliatory measures, including the postponement of the proposed 
presidential election and referendum to November (UNSG 1994c, 1994d).  
The softening of the government‘s position led the Tajik parties back to the 
negotiating table at a consultative meeting convened in Tehran on 12–17 September. 
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Both sides were indeed represented by more senior officials than they were at their 
previous talks, which was indicative of their renewed commitment to finding a 
negotiated solution to the conflict; Abdulmajid Dostiev, First Deputy Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, led the government delegation, while Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, First 
Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan, headed the opposition 
team (Zviagelskaya 1998: 166-167). On the last day of the meeting, the parties agreed 
that the ceasefire was to take effect upon the deployment of UN military observers and 
last until the day of the referendum and presidential election. An agreement was also 
reached on the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war, and it was to be 
implemented within one month (UNSG 1994d). With the arrival of a small group of UN 
military observers, the ceasefire eventually came into force on 20 October. The 
achievement of the ceasefire agreement in Tehran appeared to be brought about mainly 
by concerted pressure from Moscow and Tehran, the two major outside powers involved 
in the Tajik conflict; Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Chernishev convinced the Tajik 
government to sign the ceasefire agreement, while Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Vaezi contributed to guiding the opposition into agreement (Hay 2001: 40). 
At the third round, held from 20 October to 1 November in Islamabad, the sides 
managed to extend the ceasefire agreement until February 1995. Bent on strengthening 
its power and legitimacy, the Dushanbe government was determined to adhere to its 
unilateral strategy. In the allegedly rigged presidential election on 6 November, 
Rakhmonov defeated his sole competitor, Abdumalik Abdullajanov, Tajik ambassador to 
Russia and former prime minister. A new constitution was also adopted as a result of the 
referendum held on the same day. In mid-December the UN Security Council formally 
established the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) as a peacekeeping 
mission, but ceasefire violations continued on both sides (UNSC 1994). 
In such a situation, the opening of the next round of talks was delayed, due mainly 
to objections on the part of the opposition to holding it in Moscow as the sides had 
agreed (UNSG 1995a). In February 1995, the Dushanbe government proceeded to 
conduct parliamentary elections without the participation of the opposition, producing a 
new parliament dominated by the ruling elite. Against a backdrop of renewed military 
confrontation in early April, and also faced with persuasion by the UN mediators and 
interested states, the parties finally managed to get around the political quarrel over the 
venue problem by agreeing to meet for high-level consultations (not for the round of 
negotiations) in Moscow (UNSG 1995b). 
Those consultations convened on 19 April between the government‘s delegation, 
headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Mahmadsaid Ubaidulaev, and the opposition‘s 
delegation, headed again by Turajonzoda. The week-long meeting produced only modest 
results; a one-month extension of the ceasefire, an agreement to hold the first meeting 
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between Rakhmonov and Nuri prior to the fourth round of negotiations, and an 
agreement to begin those negotiations in late May in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan 
(UNSG 1995b). The Rakhmonov-Nuri summit materialized on 17–19 May in Kabul, 
convened and facilitated by Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The mere fact that 
the two Tajik leaders met face to face for the first time was a significant innovation, but 
in substance the meeting only resulted in a confirmation of each side‘s basic 
commitment to a negotiated solution to the conflict and an extension of the ceasefire for 
another three months (UNSG 1995c). 
 In this first period of the formula phase, the parties agreed to place the issue of 
power-sharing on the negotiation agenda, but they failed to confront the heart of the 
controversy and engage in substantive exchanges in search of a possible formula on it. 
Rather, they were preoccupied with the achievement and subsequent maintenance of a 
ceasefire, among other issues.  
 
Stalemated Negotiations: The Second Formula Phase 
 
Starting with the fourth round, the parties came to engage in more substantive and direct 
negotiations than those of earlier rounds, entering what could be seen as the second 
period of the formula phase. Indeed, when the conflicting parties met in Almaty from 22 
May to 1 June, they began to deal in depth with the key issue of power-sharing in the 
future system of joint governance. The opposition‘s delegation, headed by Turajonzoda, 
again brought up the idea of forming a transitional coalition government, as it had done 
at the Moscow round. More specifically, the opposition called for the creation of a 
Council of National Accord with supreme legislative and executive powers for the 
transitional period of up to two years, in which the government and the opposition would 
be allocated 40 percent of the posts respectively, and ethnic minorities the remaining 20 
percent. The opposition offered to recognize the presidency of Rakhmonov on the 
condition that he should accept the establishment of such a body (UNSG 1995c). In 
reaction, and apparently with Russian backing, the government‘s delegation, represented 
by Ubaidulaev, showed strong resistance to the opposition‘s proposal for power-sharing 
on the grounds of the results of the presidential election, referendum, and parliamentary 
elections (Jonson 1998: 19). Still, facilitated by the UN envoy Piriz-Ballon and Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, among others, the Tajik parties managed to produce a 
set of piecemeal agreements on lesser issues, such as the exchange of detainees and 
prisoners of war (UNSG 1995c). 
While their delegates were making slow progress on the central issue of power-
sharing, the Tajik president and the UTO Chief stepped in again during the summer to 
produce some tangible agreements. In mid-July, a meeting was held in Tehran for their 
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second direct talks. Rakhmonov and Nuri agreed to create a consultative forum of the 
peoples of Tajikistan, where Tajikistanis from all factions would convene and deliberate 
on a host of problems facing the country, and to let their negotiators carve out the 
specifics of such a forum at the subsequent round of talks. To all appearances, this forum 
fell short of the kind of a power-sharing body the opposition had pressed for—that is, a 
transitional coalition government—but it was contemplated as a possible mechanism to 
promote national reconciliation. Later in August, the two leaders produced an outline 
agreement that adumbrated a final settlement and provided guidelines for future talks, 
leaving aside the thorny problem of power-sharing. This agreement came in the form of 
the Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for Establishing Peace and National Accord 
in Tajikistan, which was largely envisioned by the UN mediation team. Piriz-Ballon 
shuttled between Rakhmonov in Dushanbe and Nuri in Kabul, and helped them sign the 
protocol separately at their respective locations. It was also agreed that the ceasefire 
would be extended for another six months and that the modality of inter-Tajik 
negotiations would be changed to that of a continuous round, which was scheduled to 
start in mid-September (UNSG 1995d). 
The opening of the fifth continuous round (composed of three phases) was 
delayed by the opposition‘s objection to Ashgabat as a venue, but it was eventually 
dropped through the good offices of UN mediators (UNSG 1995d, 1995e). When the 
parties convened in the capital of Turkmenistan at the end of November, and tried to 
edge toward substantive negotiations on a new political dispensation, the military 
confrontation sharply escalated. They barely sustained the political dialogue and 
discussed the key issue of power-sharing only to reconfirm that there existed wide 
differences between their positions. The government now proposed to set up a 
consultative forum of the peoples of Tajikistan in consonance with the summit-level 
agreement in Tehran in July. But the proposal encountered flat rejection from the 
opposition, which viewed the forum—consultative and consensus-based—as powerless, 
and thus useless. Instead, the opposition proposed to create a council of national 
reconciliation with transitional but real powers in legislative and executive realms, 
generally in line with its earlier proposal tabled at the Almaty talks. However, the 
government rejected the idea once again on the grounds that the formation of such a 
body would be unconstitutional and likely to destabilize the country (Jonson 1998: 20; 
UNSG 1996a). Thus, the first phase of the Ashgabat round came to naught, ending on 22 
December with fresh demands from the opposition raising the hackles of the government. 
Turajonzoda threatened not to return to the negotiating table for the second phase, 
demanding that CIS leaders clearly define their position on Tajikistan at their upcoming 
summit in mid-January, and also that the CIS peacekeeping forces confirm their 
neutrality (UNSG 1996a; Jonson 1998: 11). 
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In the course of the second formula phase, the parities deliberated on the formula 
in greater depth but reached a deadlock. They never even went so far as to reciprocate 
compromises that would construct an agreeable, workable formula. Instead, they were 
toying with a weaker, obscure notion of power sharing in the form of a consultative 
forum. In this situation, the parties barely managed to agree on the overall framework 
for settlement and its basic principles. 
 
Spurred Negotiations: The Third Formula Phase 
 
The turn of the year saw a major shift in Russia‘s policy toward to Tajikistan, which in 
turn brought the Tajik parties into the third period of the formula phase, characterized by 
crises and breakthroughs. In deference to the Tajik opposition‘s demand, Russia allowed 
the Tajik conflict to be placed high on the agenda at the CIS summit meeting, held in 
Moscow on 19 January 1996. Annoyed with the sluggish pace of inter-Tajik talks, 
Russia, in conjunction with Central Asian states, moved to exert strong pressure on 
Rakhmonov to negotiate seriously with the opposition and settle the conflict (Panfilov 
1996). The CIS‘s joint action at the Moscow summit largely satisfied the Tajik 
opposition‘s conditions for continuing negotiations, and the second phase of the 
continuous round took place from 26 January to 18 February. Yet almost at the same 
time that a political dialogue resumed in Ashgabat, a military confrontation intensified in 
Tajikistan. The Rakhmonov regime was challenged by rebellions from the opposition 
and also from within its own camp (Bulavinov 1996). In the midst of this crisis, Yevgeny 
Primakov, in his new capacity as Russian foreign minister, visited Dushanbe to 
underscore Russian interest in stabilizing the situation in the country (Konstantinova 
1996). 
 The outside pressure and the domestic instability led the Tajik government to 
adopt a conciliatory stance at the negotiating table. Replacing Ubaidulaev as the chief 
government negotiator, Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov proposed the holding of a 
special session of the Parliament with the participation of the opposition leaders to 
discuss the integration of the opposition and its armed forces into the government‘s 
administrative and military structures. The opposition side gave consent to the proposal 
but eventually retracted it, heartened by some military successes. Thus, the session 
actually convened in early March without the participation of the opposition leaders, 
reducing a potential milestone in the Tajik peace process to a mere political ceremony. 
Also at the second Ashgabat talks, the two sides came close to reaching agreement on 
the consultative forum of the peoples of Tajikistan, but differences over when it should 
convene prevented any actual agreement. There the opposition insisted that a council of 
national reconciliation should be established instead, and that it should precede the 
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convening of the consultative forum (UNSG 1996a). 
During the spring and summer of 1996, military conflict continued to escalate, 
despite extensions of the ceasefire agreement. Further adding to the deterioration of the 
situation were demonstrations in the Leninabad region in May that called for improved 
socio-economic conditions and greater autonomy for the region (Lantsman 1996). In the 
circumstances, the parties needed to devote much attention to finding ways to restore an 
effective ceasefire in the third phase of the Ashgabat talks in July. Although the parties 
extended the ceasefire again, this time until the end of 1996, and the UN stepped up its 
efforts at monitoring its implementation in central Tajikistan, the intensity of hostilities 
between the sides never diminished (UNSG 1996b). Deliberations on fundamental 
political issues were sustained but met with little progress. Apparently backed by Russia, 
the government side tabled the idea of a Commission of Reconciliation that would 
prepare amendments to the Tajik constitution and electoral law. It also proposed the 
participation of the opposition in government structures and the legalization of all 
political parties and movements. The opposition, however, rejected the concept of the 
Commission of Reconciliation, which would be advisory in nature, and thus, in their 
view, lack substantive power. Nonetheless, the sides agreed to try and arrange a meeting 
between Rakhmonov and Nuri in Moscow (Velekhov 1996; Jonson 1998: 20-21).  
Meanwhile, a new political movement emerged in Tajik politics. Following the 
Leninabad demonstrations in May, Abdullajanov, a contestant in the November 1994 
presidential election, and two other former Leninabadi prime ministers moved to 
establish the National Revival Bloc, calling for their inclusion in the ongoing inter-Tajik 
negotiations. The appearance of this ―third force‖ was to pose a difficult problem to the 
two negotiating (and warring) sides and mediators (Akbarzadeh 2001). 
The Taliban‘s capture of Kabul at the end of September gave a strong impetus to 
jump-start the stalled peace process, generating a sense of urgency, not only on the part 
of the Tajik parties themselves, but also the mediators. The Tajik parties demonstrated 
their renewed commitment to accommodation at a preparatory working meeting of 
experts in Tehran on 9–17 October, where they tried to prepare a draft agreement for 
signature by Rakhmonov and Nuri at their Moscow meeting scheduled for mid-October. 
The parties made remarkable progress in agreeing on the main principles of the formula 
for settlement, among others, the establishment of a Commission on National 
Reconciliation (CNR) as an ―authoritative body with defined responsibilities and 
powers‖. Unfortunately, the parties failed to complete the draft agreement due to their 
differences over the exact nature of CNR, which prevented the Rakhmonov-Nuri summit 
from taking place as scheduled (UNSG 1996c). 
As the meeting at the working level ended inconclusively and the momentum was 
about to dissipate, Rakhmonov and Nuri themselves intervened to take a major step 
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forward in the negotiation process. At their meeting on 10–11 December in Khusdeh, 
northern Afghanistan, the two leaders initialed the text of a draft agreement that their 
delegates had left unfinished in Tehran two months earlier, while pledging to halt 
ongoing fighting, especially in central Tajikistan (UNSG 1997a). Afghan President 
Rabbani and his military commander Ahmed Shah Massoud mediated these agreements 
(Peshkov and Achakhmat 1997: 82-84). 
At first it was expected that the Moscow summit would be a relatively smooth 
process, as the two leaders were to meet on 19 December in order to just sign the 
document that they had already initialed in Afghanistan. The agreement stipulated a 
timetable for the peace process (calling for conclusion of a final agreement by 1 July 
1997 and its implementation within the transition period of 12 to 18 months) and 
provided for the establishment of the CNR to function during the transition period, to be 
chaired by a UTO representative. It also extended the ceasefire for the entire duration of 
inter-Tajik negotiations and prescribed a universal amnesty and a full exchange of 
prisoners of war and detainees. The negotiations in Moscow, however, turned out to be 
much more complex. The opposition unexpectedly declared its intention to seek changes 
to the initialed text of the Khusdeh agreement. Although it had been agreed in 
Afghanistan that the CNR‘s composition, functions, and powers would be discussed at 
the subsequent round of negotiations in Tehran, the opposition insisted that these issues 
be decided in Moscow and incorporated into the agreement. This demand posed a major 
obstacle to the ultimate signing of the agreement by Rakhmonov and Nuri, and it 
actually put the negotiations on the verge of a complete breakdown. However, it was 
eventually accommodated by drafting a separate protocol outlining the primary 
functions and powers of the CNR (leaving its composition untouched), keeping the 
Khusdeh agreement intact. Thus, on 23 December, Rakhmonov and Nuri managed to 
sign the two agreements: the Khusdeh agreement, which demarcated the overall shape of 
a final agreement, and the protocol of the CNR, which provided for its core element 
(UNSG 1997a). 
Most importantly, the protocol of the CNR defined the role of this new joint body 
in the country‘s existing political system, which had been the biggest sticking point 
between the conflicting sides. Together with the President, the CNR would work to 
implement the agreements reached during the course of inter-Tajik talks. Specifically, it 
would develop proposals for changes to the constitution to be submitted to a national 
referendum, and would draft a new electoral law to be approved by Parliament. It would 
also facilitate the integration of the opposition and its military units into governmental 
executive and power structures. The CNR‘s other functions would include suggesting the 
timing of parliamentary elections to be held under international supervision. The CNR 
would then dissolve after the convening of a new Parliament (Abdullaev and Barnes 
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2001: 69-70). Indeed, the protocol was the product of mutual compromises by the two 
sides. The Tajik government finally agreed to accord substantial powers to the CNR, 
although it had wanted to render that body consultative in nature. From the standpoint of 
the opposition, the CNR would be granted ―certain governmental powers, but fewer than 
the opposition had sought‖ (Roslova 1996). The CNR was by no means a transitional 
coalition government with supreme legislative and executive powers that the opposition 
had sought for. Indeed, the incumbent government would continue to exist in spite of 
some inclusion of opposition representatives, and the current parliament would continue 
to function while sharing some of its legislative powers with the CNR.  
Several external actors made a significant contribution to realizing these 
agreements. Russian diplomats, especially First Deputy Foreign Minister Boris 
Pastukhov, together with UN Special Representative Gerd Merrem, induced the two 
sides to make reciprocal concessions in the CNR protocol. Particularly, Pastukhov 
played an important role in delivering Rakhmonov to agreement. On the other hand, 
Iranian and Afghan mediators were instrumental in convincing Nuri of the need for 
compromises at the Moscow summit. Additionally, the Tajik leaders were then faced 
with an urgent appeal for rapprochement from senior UN officials in New York (Rotar 
1996; Peshkov and Achakhmat 1997: 83-84). Thus what made the Tajik parities swallow 
these critical agreements was combined external pressure—the leverages applied by 
their close patrons, namely Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as the UN‘s influence 
arising from its international legitimacy and moral authority. 
Thus in the third formula phase, the Tajik parties went through a process of 
bargaining and compromising for the construction of a power-sharing formula. Despite 
ups and downs in the process, the parties continued to face the constant need to find a 
mutually agreeable solution, coming under pressure arising from internal instability and 
external—particularly Russian—influence. 
 
Path toward Final Agreement: The Detail Phase  
 
With the general formula for a settlement put in place, the time had come to add 
specifics to it. The detail phase began on 6 January 1997, with the opening of the sixth 
round of inter-Tajik talks convened in Tehran. However, a major crisis involving the 
forces of Mahmud Khudoiberdyev, commander of the First Brigade of the Tajik army, 
soon unfolded in Tursunzade. In an atmosphere of heightened instability at home, the 
parties met in the Iranian capital to refine the formula of the CNR, more specifically, to 
settle the sticky issue of how many seats the CNR was to have in total, as well as the 
percentage spilt of those seats between the two sides. The opposition suggested that the 
new body should consist of 40 members, who were to be drawn 40 percent each from 
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the negotiating parties and the remaining 20 percent from Abdullajanov‘s National 
Revival Bloc. Rejecting the parties‘ equal share outright, the government‘s negotiating 
team made a counteroffer of 17 seats with an 80-20 split weighted in its favor. Moreover, 
the Tajik government flatly turned down the inclusion of the National Revival Bloc on 
the CNR, denying the very existence of a ―third force‖ (Rotar 1997). Although the 
parties were unable to resolve the delicate issue of the composition of the CNR, they 
agreed on its size—fixed on 27 members, but later reduced by one (UNSG 1997a). 
Between 20–21 February, Rakhmonov and Nuri again held direct talks in 
Mashhad, Iran, in order to overcome major obstacles in the settlement of the conflict. 
They reached an agreement on the statute of the CNR, with provisions on its 
composition and structure. The CNR would consist of equivalent numbers of 
government and UTO representatives, leaving no seats for other Tajik parties. As for the 
structure, the CNR would establish four sub-commissions relating to political, military, 
refugee, and legal issues. The two leaders also agreed that the UTO would be included in 
30 percent of executive branch posts in the government (UNSG 1997b).  
In shifting the negotiation agenda from political coexistence to military 
integration, the parties took further steps toward each other at the seventh round of inter-
Tajik talks, held in Moscow from 26 February to 8 March. They discussed disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of the UTO forces into the government power 
structures, as well as the reform of those structures. On how to accomplish this, the 
government side, represented by Nazarov, started with the proposal that armed 
opposition units should first lay down their arms, disband and then merge into the 
country‘s regular armed forces in small groups of about 5 to 15 men. In contrast, the 
opposition's proposal, presented by Turajonzoda, suggested that opposition fighters 
should initially join the government‘s power structures unit by unit, retaining battalion 
and company divisions, and be stationed separately but under a single command. 
Although the formation of a unified national army turned out to be a complex item on 
the agenda, as is often the case with negotiations to end internal conflict, the sides 
eventually managed to reach an agreement with the help of UN and Russian mediators. 
Under the Protocol on Military Issues, the reintegration of UTO armed forces was to be 
a gradual process, consisting of four stages: disarmament at the designated assembly 
points (first stage); incorporation into the country‘s regular armed forces as separate 
units and being subordinated to corresponding chains of command, as well as the public 
announcement of disbandment by the UTO leadership (second stage); suitability 
screening for individual members of the UTO armed units by the newly-created Joint 
Review Board (third stage); and the complete merger (fourth stage) (Abdullaev and 
Barnes 2001: 73-74). 
The eighth and final round of talks was opened in Tehran on 9 April, as Russia 
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and Central Asian neighbors pressed harder for rapid termination of the conflict in 
Tajikistan, increasingly concerned over the prospect of the Taliban‘s renewed spring 
offensive in Afghanistan. The talks became stalled, however, over a particular 
disagreement between the sides on the timing of lifting the ban on opposition parties, 
and were suspended shortly after. Here the impasse was again resolved at Rakhmonov 
and Nuri‘s face-to-face meeting. On 16–18 May in Kyrgyzstan, they succeeded in 
drawing up the Protocol on Political Issues, which settled the question of legalizing 
UTO parties and movements, and liberalizing mass media by linking them to the 
implementation of the military protocol. The government‘s negotiating position was that 
the legalization of the opposition parties would come only after the disarmament of UTO 
military forces, which was rejected by the opposition side. Not surprisingly, the 
government wanted to make the adversary powerless militarily before allowing it to 
become a legitimate contestant politically. The opposition, on the other hand, sought to 
make sure that it would be a viable participant in normal politics when giving up its 
military means of struggle. The compromise reached by the two leaders was that the 
government would lift the restrictions on the opposition parties and media following the 
implementation of the second phase of the military protocol, and that they would operate 
within the country‘s constitutional and legal framework. On that occasion, Rakhmonov 
and Nuri also announced the Bishkek Memorandum, spelling out that the strength of 
UTO personnel to be stationed in Dushanbe to protect opposition CNR members would 
be 460 armed units and 40 guards (UNSG 1997c).  
These top-level agreements allowed the eighth round of talks to resume several 
days later. There the parties signed the Protocol on the Guarantees, which provided for 
the roles of the UN and observer countries in monitoring and enforcing the 
implementation of all the agreements achieved thus far (UNSG 1997c). Although the 
parties agreed on the arrangements for political guarantees, they differed over ways to 
buttress their agreements in military terms. The opposition side insisted that the protocol 
should provide for the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping forces and their replacement 
by UN peacekeeping forces, to be composed of contingents from the observer countries, 
not least Iran and Pakistan. But the government‘s delegation flatly rejected these 
proposals on the grounds that the issue of the CIS peacekeeping forces fell outside the 
jurisdiction of negotiators at the inter-Tajik talks (BBC 1997). Thus the presence of the 
CIS peacekeeping forces was to remain as a major vehicle for ensuring the military 
stability necessary for the implementation of the agreements. 
Thus the parities completed the detail phase of the negotiations, carving out the 
specifics of the power-sharing formula (such as numbers, percentages, timing and 
procedures), solidifying the formula with supplementary agreements on military aspects, 
in terms of integration and guarantees. 
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On 27 June in Moscow, Rakhmonov and Nuri signed the General Agreement on 
the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. The two leaders signified 
the negotiated settlement of the Tajik conflict in the presence of Russian President 
Yeltsin as well as foreign ministers of the observer countries, and Merrem and other 
representatives of the UN, the OSCE, and the OIC (UNSG 1997d). These outside actors 
jointly legitimized and endorsed the outcome of inter-Tajik negotiations that had 
necessitated about three years. 
 
Conclusions: Explaining Process and Outcome 
 
It has been seen so far that the negotiations between the Tajik government and the UTO 
proceeded through successive stages of diagnostic, formula, and detail phases to bring 
an end to the conflict. Now it is necessary, in conclusion, to try to answer a major 
question: why did the negotiation process move along as it did and lead to a successful 
settlement of the conflict? In seeking the explanation behind the particular negotiated 
outcome in Tajikistan, it might be possible to posit that the outcome had been 
adumbrated from the outset; the nature of the conflict largely predetermined power 
sharing between the parties as a formula for settlement. As discussed at the outset, the 
Tajik civil war was primarily a struggle among regions over political power and 
economic resources, not a contest among different ideological camps or ethnic 
communities. As Dov Lynch (2001) argued, the lack of conflict over future ideas for the 
state created common ground between the warring parties. Because there were no viable 
alternatives to the existing state without secessionist options, nor any prospects for a 
unilateral victory, the parties were encouraged to build on this common ground and 
settle their conflict through power sharing. At the same time, it took about three years of 
negotiations—albeit relatively short in view of general intractability of internal 
conflicts—before the parties came to accept power sharing as the only solution, 
ultimately agreeing on a specific form power sharing in order to settle the conflict. Thus, 
any explanation of the success in Tajikistan must provide some answers to the key 
question of how the parties came to overcome resistance and to fully recognize and 
exploit such common ground. 
The possibility of political settlement on the basis of power sharing between the 
conflicting parties was contemplated by the parties from the beginning of the formula 
phase; it was indeed on the agenda of the inter-Tajik negotiations from the very first 
round in April 1994. However, both sides harbored a strong mutual distrust of one 
another, and were indeed far from convinced of the desirability and inevitability of 
power sharing. Backed by Russia, the Rakhmonov government remained bent on 
annihilating the opposition and continued to resist making substantive compromises on 
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the issue of power sharing; the UTO retained the hope of replacing the Kulyabi-
dominated government, questioning its legitimacy and right to govern. The parties took 
some steps towards achieving a ceasefire agreement in September 1994, but their basic 
positions were still of a unilateral nature, and diametrically opposed throughout the first 
period of the formula phase. 
The process of these two one-sided positions being brought together into a 
formula for a new political dispensation began slowly and tentatively at the fourth round 
in Almaty. It was still the case, however, that in this second formula phase the two sides 
continuously presented proposals aimed at advancing their own unilateral positions, 
without there being any serious effort to bridge the differences between them. The result 
was a stalemate, but from this, the search for a formula gained momentum, particularly 
in the third period of the formula phase, beginning in 1996. At that juncture, both parties 
had certainly begun to perceive the need to seek a way out of the conflict, although they 
frequently encountered deadlocks and crises at the negotiating table. With each side‘s 
winning mentality and commitment worn down, they came to realize that they were in a 
―mutually hurting stalemate‖ (Zartman 1989). Both sides had begun to lose confidence 
in a unilateral, military victory, and slowly realized that there was a need instead for a 
compromised, political solution. The Rakhmonov regime had never been capable of 
defeating the UTO outright and was now also faced with rebellious challenges from 
within. The UTO, on the other hand, was able to achieve some military successes and 
disturb the regime, but had no strength to replace it (Jonson 1998: 26-27; Lynch 2001: 
56-58). The parties‘ predicament was also compounded by the unsettling effects of the 
rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, Rakhmonov and Nuri 
reached an agreement on the CNR, a new body for promoting political coexistence, at 
the Moscow summit in December 1996. Following this breakthrough, the parties were 
able to go on to the detail phase, during which they negotiated the details that would 
implement the formula and eventually conclude the final peace agreement in June 1997. 
However, the success of the Tajik negotiations cannot be solely attributed to the 
policies and actions of the warring parties. Rather, the involvement of mediators, which 
influenced those internal dynamics at various junctures, was certainly a major 
contributing factor.
3
 It was clearly the collaboration between Russia and Iran that served 
as the driving force behind the progress of the peace process. Capitalizing on a powerful 
source of leverage, they pressured the Rakhmonov government and the Islamic 
opposition respectively to make the mutual concessions necessary for settling the 
conflict. This form of complementary pressure was already evident toward the end of the 
diagnostic phase, and contributed to bringing both Tajik sides to the negotiating table in 
                                                             
3
 Earlier articles by the author (Iji 2001, 2005) have focused on this external dimension of the Tajik 
peace process. 
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Moscow in April 1994. The Russian-Iranian joint influence also came to the fore during 
the first formula phase; it was instrumental in leading them into the ceasefire agreement 
at the Tehran talks in September 1994. Subsequently, as Russia and Iran became 
increasingly serious about settling the Tajik conflict with a Taliban regime on the rise in 
Afghanistan, they strengthened cooperative mediation efforts. In the third formula phase, 
these two states worked together in leading the Tajik parties into key agreements on 
power sharing at the December 1996 summit in Moscow. Importantly, such 
intensification of the joint mediation occurred against a backdrop of a change in Russian 
policy. Although Moscow was initially intent on consolidating the Rakhmonov regime 
and eliminating the opposition militarily, it eventually began to seek a political 
resolution to the conflict after coming to the belief that a quick victory was unlikely, and 
a continuation of the war would prove very costly for itself. As a result, Russia 
abandoned its policy aimed at winning the conflict and acted to push Rakhmonov for a 
settlement. In particular, it was during this critical part of the formula phase that external 
pressure, combined with the internal ‗hurting stalemate,‘ produced the renewed 
momentum that the Tajik parties needed to reach an agreement on the formula. 
Additionally, during the detailed phase, similar effects continued to work on the parties 
in order for them to uphold the established formula.  
Although Russia and Iran were at the centre of international mediation efforts, 
other external actors also helped to bring about the settlement of the conflict. When 
other observer states hosted negotiations on their territory, they were given an 
opportunity to take the lead in facilitating them, and to provide additional pressure and 
good offices to the parities. No less important, the UN mediators played a role in the 
diagnostic phase, and once formal negotiations got started, they acted as the sponsor and 
coordinator of the negotiation process, making a significant contribution to ensuring its 
continuity through the formula and detailed phases. The organization‘s international 
legitimacy and impartiality allowed its representatives to chair the rounds of the 
negotiations and serve as a line of communication between the conflicting sides, as well 
as among the observer states. The UN mediation team was also in a position to devise a 
broad peacemaking strategy and enlist political support for it from other third parties. At 
times, the UN mediators moved to add to the pressure exerted by state mediators on the 
Tajik parties (Goryayev 2001).  
In sum, the parties to the Tajik conflict muddled through a series of negotiation 
stages in order to achieve a political settlement, both by virtue of their actions and 
policies and the influence of the mediators‘ involvement. These internal and external 
dynamics interacted with each other to bring about the negotiated outcome. But it should 
also be remembered that the outcome of the Tajik negotiations was a modest success. 
The cause of the conflict—a struggle over power and representation among regions—
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made possible a settlement by means of power sharing, but the underlining cause of the 
conflict has remained to date; the power sharing achieved has proved to be limited and 
superficial, to the extent that regionalism still prevails in the country as a bar to efforts at 
consolidating the nation politically, economically, and socially. Therefore, the Tajik case 
stands not only as a success to emulate in trying to terminate violent civil conflict 
through negotiation and mediation, but also as a cautionary tale about the limits of such 
tools of conflict management. 
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